# "Jumps and Post-FOMC Announcement Drifts in Currency Markets" Suzanne Lee, Minho Wang

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### What does this paper do?

- Study the intraday return dynamics in currency markets around FOMC announcements, focusing on the post-FOMC drifts (+0 hr : +48 hrs)
  - $\Rightarrow$  What does the drift look like?
  - $\Rightarrow$  How persistent is it?
  - $\Rightarrow$  What predicts the drift magnitude?
  - ⇒ When is the phenomenon stronger (across currencies, time, MP decisions)?

## Currency market announcement drifts

- Mueller, Tahbaz-Salehi, and Vedolin (2017, JF): there is a significant pre-FOMC announcement drift in the currency excess returns (typically starting from -48 or -72 hours prior to the announcement)
- Suppose interest rate in the US is smaller than that in the foreign country;  $e_{i,t}$  is the quantity of dollars per unit of foreign currency *i*; investors in each country (e.g., US) have downward-sloping demand for assets denominated in the other country's currency (e.g., foreign); period 1 = FOMC announcement time.
- The representative investor wants to maximize expected profit in the currency market, where the interest rate for US until the resolution (period=1) contains MP uncertainty ( $\sigma_R > 0$ ). An increase in MP uncertainty due to an upcoming announcement results in depreciation in foreign currencies against dollar pre-announcement, followed by an expected appreciation in the future ( $E_t[e_{i,t+1}]$  ↑)
- ► However, the literature does not focus much on the **post-FOMC drift**.

#### This Paper My Comments Conclusion

#### Main findings from this paper

- What does the drift look like? Persistency?
  - (1) Negative post-FOMC excess returns dollar appreciates
  - (2) Most consistently come from +12hr:+24hr periods



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- What predicts the negative drift magnitude?

 $rx_{i,w+1} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 * JVOL_{i,w}^- + \theta_2 * JVOL_{i,w}^- * I_{w = [+0hr:+12hr]} + \theta_3 * I_{w = [+0hr:+12hr]}$ 

(3) **Negative drift is predicted by negative jump volatility in exchange rates** – higher volatility coming from dollar appreciation during [+0hr:+12hr] post FOMC, more negative the drift during [+12hr:+24hr] is

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- More pronounced when/with:
  - (4) High currency market volatility periods
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  - (6) Non-OECD or developing currencies

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#### • Overall puzzle:

The long, negative post-FOMC drift is surprising, while the expectation may be that, once uncertainty is resolved, everything moves on instantaneously.

- There is no problem with the main specification (i.e., every 12-hour as a unit for time unit w; construct predictors and interact it with different period indicators in order to learn: which period has the strongest predictability)
- But in my view, what happens to changes in FX (<sup>e<sub>i,t+1</sub></sup>/<sub>e<sub>i,t</sub>) during the [0hr:12hr] period is probably the first-order effect to understand.
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- One can argue that predictability of  $JVOL_{i,w}^-$  on  $rx_{i,w+1}$  is simply mechanical:
  - ⇒ As meeting finishes, uncertainty resolves, risk premium drops, dollars will eventually appreciate after FOMC, which will drive down the excess returns [as speculated in MTV2017].
  - ⇒ Therefore, the negative jump volatility can predict further negative excess returns because  $JVOL_{i,w}^-$  is negatively associated with negative returns. This story is somewhat suggested in Table 5, "lagged returns"; if we plug "lagged returns" into the interaction, results may still show.
  - $\Rightarrow$  Is it volatility or simply return trend that is predicting the future return trend?

Suggestion 1: Discuss sources and their relative importance

- Theoretically, there should be two sources to explain excess return movements after FOMC – dummy effect and directional effect:
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  - (2.1) Changes in risk or growth perception given MP decision
  - (2.2) Changes in interest rate perception given MP decision

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 $rx_{i,t+1} = log(e_{i,t+1}) - log(e_{i,t}) + int_{i,t} - int_{US,t}$ 

- Effects of "(1) Decreases in monetary policy uncertainty": dollar starts to appreciate, excess return demanded decreases
- Effects of "(2.1) Changes in risk or growth perception given MP surprises": unclear
- Effects of "(2.2) Changes in interest rate perception given MP surprises": tightening decision compared to current period will yield lower excess returns easing ... higher ...



- Channel (2.1) seems to dominate (e.g., positive and negative jumps for easing)
   (to think about initial trend/jump)
- Channel (1) gets offset a little by certain (2.1) effects; minutes after the MP announcement, traders are more reacting to the directional effect, rather than the resolution of uncertainty.

#### Suggestion 2: Add pre-FOMC announcement drift in prediction

Now, suppose we tease out a pure "uncertainty resolution", controlling for channel (2.1) and channel (2.2). How does it look like? How much MP uncertainty is recovered, or there is a part of uncertainty elevation that takes many days to resolve?

- (potentially useful to provide testable hypotheis for theoretical models)

 To measure degree of recovery, one can consider, in Table 5 (instead of time-currency FEs) perhaps simply including pre-FOMC announcement drift size will further support the uncertainty resolution story during [+12hr:+24hr].

#### #2 MP surprises results

- As mentioned before, the MP surprise effect seems dominate (Channel (2) from my previous slides) in determining the initial responses, offsetting the "dummy effect" (through uncertainty resolution).
- However, sometimes, a higher-than-expected interest rate surprise is being priced as a positive shock to asset markets (Jarocinski and Karadi 2020; Bekaert, Hoerova, Xu, 2021; among many others) – Central bank information

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Monetary Policy vs. Central Bank information shocks (Jarocinski & Karadi, AEJ, 2020)



### #2 MP surprises results



- Why could + surprises generate both positive and negative directional changes in excess returns? (Pointing to the MP vs CBI interpretation)
- Comparing the second and fourth lines (from top down): When + surprises generate CBI effect, lower risk and higher growth expected from US, which should be more in line with the fourth line.

When + surprises generate MP effect, this more in line with the second line (excess return continues to increase).

The sharp drop from the fourth line: CBI effect seems stronger these days (consistent with Bekaert, Hoerova & Xu)

## Conclusion

- The paper is super well-organized, and empirically very convincing. I also think the paper has a lot of potential to bring more attention to post-FOMC announcement – which should be equally important from the investment view point (but it is conceptually and economically harder to interpret due to information release).
- My "quibbles":
  - Using trend to predict trend? Therefore, it is important to clearly separate out and discuss pricing sources, given all the stylized facts from the jump in the first 12 hours to the overall dampening excess returns after 12th hour: (1) Uncertainty resolution, (2) directional pricing channels given MP decision (risk, growth, interest rate).
  - MP surprises: tale of two stories. Therefore, I suggest separately consider FOMC dates when primarily capital markets price in CBI shocks versus pure MP shocks.

# Thank You!

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